FALL IN PETROLEUM PRICES Has the economics of oil changed
bsc chronicle feb 2015
FALL
IN PETROLEUM PRICES
Has
the economics of oil changed?
The oil price has fallen by more than 40
per cent since Jun, when it was $115 a barrel.
It is now below $60. This comes
after nearly five years of stability. At
a meeting in Vienna on 27 Nov. the organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC), which controls nearly 40 per cent of the world market, failed
to reach agreement on production curbs, sending the price tumbling.
Why is the price of oil falling? The oil price is partly determined by actual
supply and demand, and partly by expectation.
Demand for energy is closely related to economic activity. It also spikes in the winter in the northern
hemisphere, and during summers in countries which use air-conditioning. Supply can be affected by weather (which
prevents tankers loading) and by geopolitical upsets. If producers think the price is staying high,
they invest, which after a lag boosts supply.
Similarly, low prices lead to an investment drought.
OPEC’s decisions shape expectations: if it
curbs supply sharply, it can send prices spiking. Saudi Arabia produces nearly 10m barrels a
day --- a third of the OPEC total. But
it can also weather a low price.
Moreover, history suggests most of the gains from any cut in its output
would go to other producers. Saudi
Arabia did try the tactic in the early 1980s, cutting its output from 10m
barrels per day in 1980 to under 2.5m in 1985-1986. The result was higher prices, but also a boom
in investment, and then production, in places such as Britain and Norway.
Trying to save OPEC with such tactics could
be even more dangerous now. Keeping the
price up would be good news for frackers, speeding the spread of that
technology from America to other countries.
Costly oil spurs thrift too, hastening the shift away from oil in
transport. Every hybrid or electric car
spells lost business for oil producers.
Why encourage them?
Cheap oil also has its consolations. Russia and Iran, two countries with which
Saudi Arabia has its differences, are suffering much more. Better still, if low prices stem investment
in other sources of oil, such as Canada’s tar sands or America’s shale, it
means more demand for low-cost Saudi oil in future.
Cheaper oil should act like a shot of
adrenalin to global growth. A $40 price
cut shifts some $ 1.3. tn from producers to consumers. Big importing countries such as the euro
area, India, Japan and Turkey are enjoying especially big windfalls. Since this money is likely to be spent rather
than stashed in a sovereign-wealth fund, global GDP should rise. The falling oil price will reduce already-low
inflation still further, and so may encourage central bankers towards looser
monetary policy. The Federal Reserve
will put off raising interest rates for longer; the European Central Bank will
act more boldly to ward off deflation by buying sovereign bonds.
There will, of course, be losers,
Oil-producing countries whose budgets depend on high prices are in particular
trouble. The trouble tumbled as Russia’s
prospects darkened further. Nigeria has
been forced to raise interest rates and devalue the naira. Venezuela looks ever closer to defaulting on
its debt. The spectre of defaults and
the speed and scale of the price plunge have unnerved financial markets. But the overall economic effect of cheaper
oil is clearly positive.
Just how positive will depend on how long
the price stays low. That is the subject
of a continuing tussle between OPEC and the shale-drillers. Several members of the cartel want it to cut
its output, in the hope of pushing the price back up again. But Saudi Arabia, in particular, seems
mindful of the experience of the 1970s, when a big leap in the price prompted
huge investments in new field, leading to a decade – long glut. Instead, the Saudiseem to be pushing a
different tactic; let the price fall and put high-cost producers out of
business. That should soon crimp
supply, causing prices to rise.
Four things are now affecting the
picture. Demand is low because of weak
economic activity, increased efficiency, and a growing switch away from oil to
other fuels. Second, turmoil in Iraq and
Libya – two big oil producers with nearly 4m barrels a day combined – has not
affected their output. The market is
more sanguine about geopolitical risk.
Third, America has become the world’s largest oil producer. Though it does not export crude oil, it now
imports much less, creating a lot of spare supply. Finally, the Saudis and their Gulf allies
have decided not to sacrifice their own market share to restore the price. They could curb production sharply, but the
main benefits would go to countries they detest such as Iran and Russia.
The main effect of this is on the riskiest
and most vulnerable bits of the oil industry.
These include American frackers who have borrowed heavily on the
expectation of continuing high prices.
They also include Western oil companies with high-cost projects
involving drilling in deep water or in the Arctic, or dealing with maturing and
increasingly expensive fields such as the North Sea. But the greatest pain is in countries where
the regimes are dependent on a high oil price to pay for costly foreign
adventures and expensive social programmes.
These include Russia (already hit by Western sanctions) and Iran (which
is paying to keep the Assad regime afloat in Syria).
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